The sequel to Sailing Clear
Captain Tom Larring barely escaped alive from a mission in Afghanistan. He now has another task. Effi Miani has been undercover in the Middle east but is needed for the same operation. Together they must find Bravo-One-One who is the highest priority target for MI6. He is believed to be building a chemical weapon in Northwest Pakistan. A previous MI6 operation has already failed. A leak or a traitor inside MI6 may have destroyed that mission, so extra precautions must be taken otherwise this team will also fail.Tom and Effi need a faultless back story before embarking on their mission. The operation needs financing and a cover story. The help of a former disgraced MI6 officer, Michelle Houston, and her lover, Hugh Turnbill, is sought. They successfully control the laundering of black funds for the security services whilst sailing clear of the security services. Some of the MI6 leadership wants to gain direct control of the money and the couple, despite previous agreements. They want that control regardless of the risks to the operations in Pakistan. They think they may get leverage using two former teenage runaways connected to the couple.The hunt for whoever leaked the information continues. Suspicions are raised. The internal security team needs to prevent the traitor putting the financiers and the operation at risk. An MI5 team is on the trail of a suspicious Saudi diplomat. He may be connected to Bravo-One-One. Closed missions should not be re-opened. The NSA and GCHQ are monitoring and tracing communications using secret programmes and techniques, but some secrets should not be shared with allies.Genre: FICTION / Espionage
Newly released sequel to Sailing Clear. No sales information yet
He was designated as an Alpha for Foreign Intelligence Service, because he held diplomatic immunity. Five had at first suspected he was Saudi Intelligence Service but it appeared, he was not. He was suspected of being something else. The designation had not yet changed. Not that the suspicion had been shared or checked with the Saudis. They had asked the Americans. A simple request in passing at a joint session and they had a negative back from CIA and FBI liaison. The problem being that it alerted their allies to their concern about another allies citizen. Joe knew that would prompt at least occasional surveillance from CIA or FBI in London unless they stuck to NSA electronic surveillance.
Joe was often amazed the various intelligence services didn’t fall over each other following various targets. The USA was supposed to share but he knew they did not always do so. Joe had also obtained some tracking of the target from GCHQ, which showed the communications trail to Dubai as well as regular reports back to Saudi Arabia. GCHQ would only share a few details about activity there given Saudi was an ally. The GCHQ links to NSA meant anything they did find would go across the pond if not to a full Five Eyes review. All sorts of real and imaginary programmes were run by the NSA and its allies.
A formal request would result in more detail if details were provided like a name or a specific telephone number. The request would lead to a Contact Chaining query using data obtained from the STELLARWIND communications interception system, and the MAINWAY databases run by the NSA. All connections could then be linked without necessarily reading or listening to the data. Algorithms would then be applied to asses the likely purpose of the contact. With billions of data elements to search through, specific requests took time, but direction of contacts to other contacts reduced the variations.
Already translated. Translated by Alicia Rodriguez